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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS 
Kent Greenfield is Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished 
Scholar at Boston College Law School. Professor Greenfield has written 
extensively about the constitutional rights of corporations. See, e.g., Kent 
Greenfield, Corporations Are People Too (And They Should Act Like It)
(2018). He is also an active participant in litigation pertaining to corporate 
accountability. In 2017, he filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme 
Court in support of respondents in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111, presenting arguments 
similar to those raised in this brief. He was also the founder and president 
of the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, a nonprofit 
corporation formed to represent law schools that opposed the so-called 
Solomon amendment. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 126 S. Ct. 
1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 (2006). Professor Greenfield submits this brief to 
aid this Court in analyzing the important state law issues pertaining to 
corporate authority that must be decided prior to reaching the 
constitutional claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court must decide a question of state corporate law before 
reaching Appellants’ constitutional claims. Namely, this Court must 
determine whether a corporation has the capacity under state law to claim 
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exemption from neutral marketplace regulations, applicable to its 
competitors, on the basis of the purported constitutional interests not of the 
company but its shareholders. Appellants’ entire case rests on the assertion 
that “Arlene’s [Flowers, Inc.’s] free-exercise rights are synonymous with 
Mrs. Stutzman’s.” Appellants’ Br. on Remand (ABR) 18 n.3. Mrs. 
Barronelle Stutzman conflates herself with the corporation that employs 
her and whose stock she owns. See Appellants’ Opening Br., dated 
10/16/15 (AB) 1 n.1 (stating that the brief would reference both the 
individual and corporate parties “collectively” as “Mrs. Stutzman”). That 
is simply not the case. The interests of a corporation are not 
“synonymous” with those of a shareholder. And they are different not 
because of federal constitutional law but because of state corporate law.  
The constitutional claims of Appellant Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., “‘a 
Washington for-profit corporation engaged in the sale of goods and 
services’” to the public, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 187 Wn.2d 804, 
822 n.1, 389 P.3d 543 (2017), depend on assumptions running contrary to 
the separation of shareholders from the corporate entity, a longstanding 
and fundamental principle of this State’s corporate law and corporate law 
generally. The constitutional interests asserted here by Appellants are not 
the interests of the corporation. The corporation is not a religious company 
and is not being forced to perform any act inconsistent with its 
- 3 -
constitutional interests as a corporation.  
Appellants instead assert the interests of Barronelle Stutzman, a 
shareholder, who demands that the Court project her religious beliefs and 
political views onto the company. She claims that the Washington Law 
Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch. 49.60 RCW, and the Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW, burden Mrs. Stutzman’s individual
religious beliefs. Mrs. Stutzman asserts that her beliefs are burdened when 
the corporation in which she owns shares is required to act as a public 
accommodation under the laws of this State. But under state law she and 
the corporation are not the same, as this Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged. This Court should not change longstanding precedent to 
deem them identical for purposes of the Washington and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
Even in situations in which a single shareholder is dominant, the 
separation of shareholder from corporation is fundamental. Separateness is 
often the very reason why founders of companies—even small ones—
choose to incorporate rather than to operate as a sole proprietorship.1
Shareholders receive immense benefits in exchange for this separation, 
1 Sole proprietorships are not legally separate from their owners. See 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia 
of the Law of Corporations § 23 (2019). The arguments urged in this brief would not apply 
to such business entities. 
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including the right of limited liability, which protects their personal assets 
from claims against the corporation. Shareholders depend on and desire 
this separation; they should not be able to assert unity with the corporation 
whenever it suits their ideological, political, or religious purposes, or 
exempts the company from regulatory obligations that bind other 
corporations. Any relaxation of this rule would cause immense definitional 
difficulties for corporations operating in the State, creating the likelihood 
of intracompany fights followed by years of litigation to define which 
corporations can assert the interests of shareholders and which cannot.  
Although Appellants cite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014), 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2018), as justifying their disregard of 
the corporate form, neither decision requires this Court to depart from its 
own state law precedents. Because Appellants’ claims impermissibly blur 
the separation between the corporation and its shareholders, this Court 
should adhere to its prior opinion and affirm the trial court’s rulings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amicus curiae joins in Respondents’ statements of the case. 
- 5 -
ARGUMENT 
I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Corporations 
And Shareholders, The Constitutional Interests Of 
Shareholders Should Not Be Projected Onto The Corporation. 
Throughout their briefs, Appellants refer to themselves collectively 
as “Mrs. Stutzman.” ABR 1 n.1. But the viability of the constitutional 
claims of appellant Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., a for-profit corporation formed 
under Washington law, depends on this Court’s willingness to assume the 
corporation holds sincere beliefs that operate to exempt it from otherwise 
applicable and neutral law. It is not the corporation that holds any such 
beliefs, but rather its shareholder and employee Mrs. Stutzman. It is Mrs. 
Stutzman who “create[s] custom floral arrangements” and who refused to 
sell wedding flowers to a same-sex couple because of “her” Southern 
Baptist faith. ABR 2, 5. Mrs. Stutzman characterizes the question to be 
decided as whether Washington can compel “her” to “violate her 
conscience,” not the conscience of the corporation in which she owns 
shares. ABR 45.  
Thus, it is not the company but rather Mrs. Stutzman who asserts a 
deep religious faith, ABR 5, and who “‘designs her wedding arrangements 
to convey an expressive message,’” ABR 35 (quoting CP 538). It is Mrs. 
Stutzman’s “artistic expression” that is allegedly being compelled, ABR 
42, in violation of her “conscience and … deeply held religious beliefs.” 
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CP 47. Mrs. Stutzman asserts that the State caused her “dignitary harm,” 
charging the State with “outlaw[ing] Mrs. Stutzman’s religious exercise, 
demean[ing] her religious beliefs as discriminatory, and stigmatiz[ing] her 
in the community.” ABR 47. Wedding flowers reflect “[h]er artistic 
designs.” ABR 6 (emphasis added). She stakes her compelled speech 
claim on the notion that state laws compel her to “violate[] her beliefs 
about marriage.” ABR 32 (emphasis added). 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., meanwhile, is a closely held Washington 
for-profit corporation that “has [Mrs.] Stutzman and her husband as the 
sole corporate officers.” CP 2200. Originally incorporated in 1989, the 
company was previously operated by Mrs. Stutzman’s mother. Several 
years later, Mrs. Stutzman purchased her mother’s shares in the 
corporation. CP 92, 535-36, 2200. The company is not chartered as a 
religious organization, nor is it a membership association organized 
around a cause, ideology, or affinity.  
In earlier stages of these proceedings, Mrs. Stutzman expressly 
emphasized the distinction between “Arlene’s Flowers’ affairs” and “her 
personal affairs.” AB 49. Based on that separateness, she contended that it 
would be unprecedented to “impose[] personal liability on a business 
owner in a public accommodation case like this.” AB 48-49. Now, 
however, Mrs. Stutzman abandons her argument that she and the 
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corporation are separate and instead claims they are one and the same. 
The constitutional claims of the corporation can succeed only if the 
company can assert Mrs. Stutzman’s religious beliefs as its own. But Mrs. 
Stutzman and Arlene’s Flowers are not the same.2 They are not identical 
for purposes of corporate law, in Washington or elsewhere. This Court 
should not change state law precedents to deem them to be identical for 
purposes of First Amendment law. 
A. Corporate separateness—i.e., legal personhood—is the 
core principle of corporate governance. 
The first principle of corporate law is that for-profit corporations 
are entities that possess legal interests of their own and a legal identity 
separate and distinct from their shareholders. This legal “personhood” 
holds true whether the for-profit corporation has two, two hundred, or two 
million shareholders. In each scenario, the corporate entity is distinct in its 
legal interests and existence from those who contribute capital to it. 
This Court has repeatedly recognized this principle of strict 
2 That the State of Washington is pursuing claims against Mrs. Stutzman as an individual 
does not mean that the State is ignoring the separation between her and the company. 
Stutzman has two roles vis-à-vis the company: shareholder and officer/employee. In 
neither role is she legally synonymous with the company. The State seeks to hold her 
accountable as an officer for her role in causing the company to violate state law. That is a 
question of her potential personal liability as an officer. That is not veil piercing, and has 
no relevance to the question of whether her views as a shareholder can be projected onto 
the company. Amicus takes no position as to her potential individual liability as an officer, 
or on the question of whether an employee of a company has a constitutional right to 
disobey a work requirement imposed by the company pursuant to state law. See infra 19. 
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separation, noting that “[a] corporation exists as an organization distinct 
from the personality of its shareholders.” Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 
92 Wn.2d 548, 552, 599 P.2d 1271 (1979). “When the shareholders of a 
corporation, who are also the corporation’s officers and directors, 
conscientiously keep the affairs of the corporation separate from their 
personal affairs, and no fraud or manifest injustice is perpetrated upon 
third-persons who deal with the corporation, the corporation’s separate 
entity should be respected.” Id. at 552-53. “A corporation’s separate legal 
identity is not lost because it is owned by one person or members of a 
single family.” State v. Brelvis Consulting LLC, 430 P.3d 685, 691 (Wn. 
Ct. App. 2018).3 The centrality of corporate separateness is well 
established and longstanding. See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415, 53 
S. Ct. 207, 77 L. Ed. 397 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are 
generally to be treated as separate entities.”). 
This separation is not an ancillary part of corporate law and 
governance. It is instead the sine qua non of the wealth-creating legal 
3 See also, e.g., Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Olson, 26 Wn. App. 638, 644, 618 P.2d 2017 
(1980) (”Typically the corporation is considered an entity separate and distinct from its 
officers or stockholders even where they are only one in number.”); Thomas V. Harris, 
Washington’s Doctrine of Corporate Disregard, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 253, 253 (1981) 
(“Corporations are ordinarily recognized as legal entities separate and distinct both from 
their own shareholders, officers, and directors, and from other corporations.”); Stephen B. 
Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil § 2:52 (2018) (“The courts of Washington appear to 
have accepted the notion that veil-piercing ought to be done only with great caution.”). 
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innovation of the corporate form. The rationale behind corporate 
separateness is to encourage entrepreneurial activity by founders, 
investment by passive investors, and risk-taking by corporate managers. 
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and 
the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 93-97 (1985). The corporate veil 
is a profound but simple device helping to achieve all three of these goals. 
Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a workable legal framework for 
corporate governance without such separation. 
Because the corporation is a separate entity, its shareholders are 
not responsible for its debts. This “privilege of limited liability,” as 
protected by the corporate veil, is “the corporation’s most precious 
characteristic.” William W. Cook, The Principles of Corporation Law 19 
(1925). If the corporation cannot pay its bills, the creditors—not the 
shareholders—bear the loss, with only very narrow exceptions. This is true 
even for a corporation with a single shareholder. 
Although the term “corporation” sometimes calls to mind large, 
publicly traded enterprises, incorporation’s insulation of shareholders’ 
personal assets from risk is especially crucial for small businesses. If 
Amazon has to pay a tort judgment, it is unlikely any particular 
shareholder would suffer devastating losses even without limited liability. 
If a local florist, bakery, or retail store is held liable in a significant tort or 
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contract judgment, the handful of shareholders would risk financial ruin if 
not for limited liability.  
That is why even where a single shareholder owns all the 
corporation’s shares, the corporate veil cannot be pierced absent 
significant misconduct or fraud on the part of the shareholder. This 
presumptive impermeability of the corporate veil has been confirmed by 
“thousands of instances where a sole shareholder was held not liable for 
either tort or contract obligation[s] of his wholly owned corporation.” 
George D. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 751 (1959); see 
generally Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil § 1.1 (2018) 
(“It is now accepted as one of the first principles of American law that 
those who own shares in corporations, whether such shareholders are 
individuals or are themselves corporations, normally are not liable for the 
debts of their corporations.”). If entrepreneurs want to remain legally 
identified with their businesses, they can. They merely need to forgo the 
benefits of limited liability.  
The corporate form acts as a subsidy to entrepreneurs and 
shareholders by offering benefits not otherwise available to those that 
operate outside of the corporate structure. In particular, the corporate form 
allows business owners to shift tax burdens as well as contract and tort 
liability to the corporation. At the same time, incorporation often provides 
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shareholder-employees with tax-advantaged health care and retirement 
plans, while shielding shareholders against personal liability for claims 
against the business. Corporations themselves hold property and pay 
debts. The financial capacity or creditworthiness of a company does not 
depend on the wealth of individual shareholders; corporations enter into 
contracts and borrow money in their own names. And—unless this Court 
uses this case to change the rule—the legal rights and constitutional 
interests of a company depend on the rights and interests of the company 
itself, not those of its shareholders. Creditors, investors, customers, and 
suppliers do not need to investigate the particularities of the corporation’s 
shareholders to decide whether to engage in business with the corporation. 
In the present case, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., argues it should be 
exempt from the WLAD and CPA because of the religious values of a 
shareholder while seeking to maintain the benefits of corporate 
separateness for all other purposes. The shareholder has benefited from 
her separateness in countless ways, including being insulated from actual 
and potential corporate liabilities since she purchased shares from her 
mother. Yet now the company and the shareholder ask this Court to 
disregard that separateness in connection with a government regulation the 
shareholder would rather the corporation not obey. Appellants want to 
argue, in effect, that the corporate veil is only a one-way ratchet: the 
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corporation’s shareholder can get protection from tort and contract 
liability by standing behind the veil, but the corporation can ask a court to 
disregard the corporate veil whenever the company is required by law to 
act in a way that offends the shareholder’s beliefs. 
Appellants cannot have it both ways. “One who has created a 
corporate arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his business 
purposes, does not have the choice of disregarding the corporate entity in 
order to avoid the obligations which the statute lays upon it for the 
protection of the public.” Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 
U.S. 432, 437, 66 S. Ct. 247, 90 L. Ed. 181 (1946); see Moline Props., Inc. 
v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S. Ct. 1132, 87 L. Ed. 1499 (1943) (holding 
that even a sole shareholder cannot seek to sidestep a corporation’s 
separateness to gain a personal tax advantage).4
The Court should not assume it can disregard this principle of 
separateness with companies such as Arlene’s Flowers and not cause 
4 As this Court is aware, courts may disregard corporate separateness when the corporate 
form is “intentionally used to violate or evade a duty.” E.g., Meisel v. M&N Modern 
Hydraulic Press Co., 97 Wn.2d 403, 409-10, 645 P.2d 689 (1982) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn.2d 580, 585, 611 P.2d 751 (1980). But the doctrine 
remains reserved for “exceptional situations,” where it is “necessary and required to 
prevent unjustified loss to the injured party.” Morgan, 93 Wn.2d at 587 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). There is no indication that such is the case here, and Appellants do not ask 
that the corporate veil be disregarded on any basis other than religious belief. Indeed, far 
from having created a corporation to circumvent state policy, Appellants instead ask this 
Court to permit circumvention of state policy by ignoring the corporation’s existence. 
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significant uncertainty, infighting, and litigation with regard to other 
companies. As a matter of corporate law, nothing inherent in Appellants’ 
arguments restricts their claims to private companies. If Appellants 
prevail, corporations such as Amazon, Costco, and Starbucks—all 
headquartered or chartered in Washington—could be subject to 
shareholder pressure to announce religious or political views to exempt 
those companies from otherwise applicable regulation. These companies, 
as well as the courts hearing such claims for exemptions, would then be 
required to engage in a complex calculus to decide which rights of which 
shareholders should prevail. 
If the Court sought to limit its holding to private or even family 
companies with a dominant shareholder, courts would still be forced to 
resolve questions about what degree and type of ownership constitutes 
“control”—a question to which corporate law provides no ready answer. 
See, e.g., Alex Poor & Michelle Reed, The “Control” Quagmire: The 
Cumbersome Concept of “Control” for the Corporate Attorney, 44 Sec. 
Reg. L.J. Art. 1 (Summer 2016). Courts would also be required to 
determine what degree of unanimity among shareholders would allow 
them to project their views onto the corporate entity.5
5 The definitional problems posed by a reversal would be immense. Would the religious 
shareholder have to own the shares at the time of the asserted constitutional burden? Would 
the religious shareholder have to own all the company’s shares, a majority of shares, or 
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The Court should not presume all privately held corporations are 
tiny. “Closely held” or even “family owned” is not synonymous with 
“small.” Some of this State’s most prominent corporations—Saltchuk 
Resources ($2.6 billion in revenues, 5,500 employees), and SanMar Corp 
($1.3 billion in revenues, 4,000 employees), for example—are privately 
held, family companies. See Puget Sound Business Journal, Washington’s 
Largest Family-Owned Companies, Feb. 1, 2019, https://tinyurl.com/ 
y3l58o3y. If this Court were to relax the rule of separateness here, such a 
holding would likely spawn further litigation over which corporations can 
claim the beliefs of their shareholders to avoid the obligations of neutral 
laws. 
A ruling for Appellants would also erode the efficiency benefits 
that the State and other market participants derive from corporate 
separateness. Customers, creditors, suppliers, investors, and state 
regulators will be unable to know whether a particular company is subject 
to the same laws as others without investigation into, and disclosure of, the 
simply be sufficiently dominant that he can control the company’s management? It is 
standard for privately held companies to have common shares and several series of 
preferred shares. How should courts determine which shareholder class’s views and beliefs 
are to be projected onto the company? If a corporation dominated by a religious shareholder 
organizes its business in multiple layers of wholly owned subsidiaries, which is routine, 
would the shareholder’s religious beliefs be projected onto the parent company only, or 
flow throughout the entire enterprise? Should courts distinguish between corporations 
chartered in Washington and those chartered in Delaware or elsewhere, as is routine? And 
what if the enterprise asserting religious beliefs changes its corporate form over time? 
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religious and political beliefs of the shareholders, the number of 
shareholders, and the capital structure of the company. The era of the 
“Green Book” was not only morally shameful but also economically 
inefficient. The State of Washington need not return to such an era.  
B. Corporate separateness should not be ignored in 
constitutional law. 
Given the importance and centrality of corporate separateness in 
corporate governance law and doctrine, Appellants have a heavy burden in 
persuading this Court to ignore these entity distinctions in its 
constitutional analysis. But Appellants do not seem to recognize the 
necessity of persuasion here, failing to make any developed argument as to 
why Mrs. Stutzman’s constitutional interests should be projected onto the 
corporation. Instead, they merely assert that “Arlene’s free-exercise rights 
are synonymous with Mrs. Stutzman’s,” ABR 18 n.3, citing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Burwell and Masterpiece Cakeshop.   
Neither U.S. Supreme Court decision controls the free exercise 
claim here. In Burwell, the question was whether for-profit corporations 
qualify as “person[s]” that could “exercise … religion” within the meaning 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. A divided Court 
concluded that closely held corporations are protected under that statute. 
134 S. Ct. at 2767-75. That holding, in turn, depended on Congress’s 
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instruction that the statutory term “exercise of religion” “be construed in 
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,” which the Court viewed 
as “an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First 
Amendment case law.” Id. at 2761-62. The Court’s decision did not 
address claims under the First Amendment. Id. at 2785.  
Masterpiece Cakeshop did involve a claim under the First 
Amendment. But the Court’s opinion said nothing about corporate 
separateness—its dispositive free-exercise holding focused entirely on the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of the cake baker and 
bakery. See 138 S. Ct. at 1729-32. Given that the parties in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop drew no distinction between the baker and his business in their 
constitutional arguments, the Court’s acquiescence in that framing can 
hardly be said to have settled the issue. And even if it had, because 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a corporation chartered under Colorado law, the 
Court’s ruling was necessarily based on assumptions about Colorado’s 
state law of corporations, not Washington’s.  
Even if Masterpiece Cakeshop offers support for the notion that 
corporations may pursue free exercise claims based on religious hostility 
to their shareholders,6 it does not follow that entity distinctions must be 
6 The free exercise ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop does not change the axiom of corporate 
separateness. When a company is targeted for official opprobrium because of the religious 
views of its shareholders—the theory of the case relied upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
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ignored in the free speech context or when shareholders raise free exercise 
challenges to neutral laws, applied without hostility. Cf. Arlene’s Flowers, 
187 Wn.2d at 848 n.20 (addressing only “Stutzman’s individual claim that 
her [free exercise] rights have been violated,” but not “whether Arlene’s 
Flowers (the corporation) has any such rights”). The U.S. Supreme Court, 
to be sure, has left no doubt that for-profit corporations and their trade 
associations may raise free speech claims. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971). But 
the Court does not equate the interests of corporations with their 
shareholders for the purpose of free speech analysis. On the contrary—
corporations are holders of their own rights.7
In this respect, for-profit corporations are distinct from 
membership associations, in that the latter represent and embody the legal 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and by Appellants here—then the company itself has a legitimate 
constitutional claim to be free of such opprobrium. The same would be true if the company 
were targeted because of the religious views of its employees or its customers. In all such 
cases it is the company that is being targeted. See Greenfield, Corporations Are People 
Too, supra, at 88-100. In the present case, however, there is no discriminatory targeting of 
the company. See State Br. on Remand 25-39; Ingersoll & Freed Br. on Remand 12-14. 
The law at issue is neutral and generally applicable to all companies providing public 
accommodation.  
7 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized corporate speech rights in order to preserve the 
“‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment,” Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 354, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010), and to protect the company’s, 
consumers’, and society’s interest in “the free flow of commercial information,” Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64, 96 S. Ct. 
1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976). The asserted interests are those of the company itself, not 
the company’s shareholders. See generally Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate 
Persons, 30 Const. Comment. 309 (2015).
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interests of their members, are deemed to share the values of their 
members, and have standing to sue on their members’ behalf. See Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 
L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977); FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52 n.2. Corporations, in contrast, 
are legally distinct entities whose shareholders may have idiosyncratic 
investment objectives, distinctive and variable economic needs, and a 
diversity of political and religious beliefs. Amazon and Arlene’s Flowers 
are not the Boy Scouts or the NAACP. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 238, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).  
Corporations stand in their own shoes as a matter of constitutional 
law. Corporations, to be sure, can and should have a role to play in public 
discourse, see First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. 
Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978), but they do not act merely as conduits 
for shareholders’ points of view or have standing to assert their 
shareholders’ constitutional interests. Courts have long recognized this 
distinction between shareholders and corporations in other constitutional 
contexts. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S. Ct. 
2284, 101 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1988) (sole shareholder has no Fifth Amendment 
right to resist a subpoena to the corporation for corporate documents that 
personally incriminate him); Brelvis Consulting, 430 P.3d at 691 (applying 
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Braswell to hold that a corporation’s owner and manager, “in his capacity 
as … custodian” of a single-member limited liability company, “may not 
resist a request for production of [the LLC’s] records on Fifth Amendment 
grounds”). 
Barronelle Stutzman is both a shareholder of Arlene’s Flowers and 
its employee. No one is challenging the sincerity of Mrs. Stutzman’s 
beliefs. But Washington law does not require her to do, say, or create 
anything as a shareholder that even arguably violates her beliefs. To the 
extent the WLAD and CPA require her to act contrary to her beliefs, those 
laws apply to her in her role as an employee of a company determined to 
be a public accommodation under Washington law. The rights of 
employees to assert a religious objection to a work requirement of an 
employer or to a requirement of state or federal anti-discrimination law is 
a separate question, one on which amicus takes no position. But there is no 
doubt that if Arlene’s Flowers has a corporate speech or religious interest 
at issue here, it is not because it has an employee, or even an officer, who 
disagrees with Washington law. For the company to have a claim, it would 
have to allege that the company qua company has been coerced into 
saying or doing something contrary to “those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 
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636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819). There is nothing inherent in the operation of 
Arlene’s Flowers or in its chartering documents that would make 
obedience to state anti-discrimination law inconsistent with “its very 
existence.” 
This is not to say that corporations cannot assert free speech or free 
exercise interests, but merely that courts should take care that the rights 
asserted belong to the corporation and not to someone else. If Mrs. 
Stutzman has an individual constitutional interest here, it cannot be used 
as the basis for a regulatory waiver for the company. Even if the individual 
employee could assert a constitutional right to be exempted from WLAD’s 
and CPA’s obligations for employees of a public accommodation (a 
question on which amicus takes no position), the company cannot leverage 
a solitary employee’s or shareholder’s objections to a regulation as the 
basis for a company-wide exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the trial court’s rulings. 
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